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Socrates and Protagoras 
I
Analyses of Protagoras* so-called ’Great Speech* are many, 
~fz>r- file <4>
farther most part addressed ie* the question how the speech
measures up to Socrates' probing earlier in the dialogue.
Scholars used to give a number of wrong answers to this question,
finding quite unnecessary fault with Protagoras* argument and
attributing to him several confusions of which he is innocent.
G.B. Kerferd, however, cleared the ground of this debris,* and
the time has arrived for examination of the Great Speech from
the other side, to see why Socrates raises at the end of the
Speech the particular group of questions Plato makes him raise,
and whether there is any connection between the Speech and
Socrates* subsequent arguments.
Some have suggested that Socrates’ single quarrel with
Protagoras is that the Sophist gives no clear account of the
2nature of goodness. It is then suggested that in the end it 
is the inability to say what goodness is which causes Protagoras’ 
downfall. That there is much truth in the second part of this 
view the final paragraphs of the dialogue show. But the first 
half of it is insufficiently precise. As M„J, Gagarin has seen, 
if Socrates saw in the Speech unelarity purely on the question 
of what is Virtue, he was sufficiently trained and fearless in 
dialectic toask at once that simple but far-reaching question.
If he asks more specific questions., as he does, it is natural 
to suppose that he has specific reasons for asking them. Gagarin 
and I,. Verr-'enyx have rightly urged, in effect, that. Socrates is
worried by the way in which terms like 'justice1, 'moderation'} 
and 'virtue* are bandied about in Protagoras' remarks without 
any clear statement of what they mean and how they are related.^ 
If, in fact, Socrates asks what the relationship is between 
Virtue and the various virtues then it is reasonable at least 
to ask whether there are not in Protagoras' preceding Speech 
some elements of unclarity, confusion and/or contradiction on 
this particular point. Socrates quotes, after all, from 
Protagoras' own words, from both myth and explanation, in pos­
ing his questions. But even this is not so exact as it might 
be. Since, therefore, it is the main contention of this paper 
that the succeeding argument is bound up very closely with the 
language used by Protagoras in the Great Speech, and with the 
structure of some of his arguments, it is well to start with 
the relatively uncontroversial example of the relationship be­
tween Protagoras on the virtues and Socrates* subsequent ques­
tions; and having here shown that Socrates' thinking is firmly 
based on what Protagoras has actually said and implied, only 
then to go on to the more disputable arguments which Socrates 
develops. We may then discover what basis for these also exists 
in the Great Speech. It will be easiest to consider the virtues 
in order.
We may start with "piety" or "holiness". Protagoras does 
not name this virtue at 322A, but nevertheless his words are 
such as to bring it to the mind of any listener (or reader, for
that matter) interested in the virtues. Early man believed in
2
and worshipped the gods, and set about constructing temples and 
statues of them* But this is before the arrival of political 
virtue on the scene (witness 321B * c l / ¿ v
political wisdom he had not, and 322B no\< Jr* ~ίχ^ν
ocimo £ tX^ v they had not yet the political art) „ If piety thus 
precedes ’’political virtue," what does Protagoras mean by in­
cluding impiety among the list of opposites of the virtues at 
323E-324A, and more positively by including holiness in a list 
of virtues at 324E-325A? How, in turn, is this to be squared 
with the suggestion at 323A that every piece of political ad­
vice (or all political virtueJ) must ’’proceed by way of” jus­
tice and moderation? If piety is part of virtue, such that to 
do & pious action is to do a virtuous one but the converse is 
not true, and justice and moderation are similar parts of Virtue, 
then (obviously) to do either & just action or a moderate one 
is to do a virtuous act loir. To conjoin justice and moderation 
as at 323E, in stating that all political advice (or virtue) 
must fee just and moderate, may give rise to certain suspicions 
in the mind of an attentive listener such as Socrates, The 
omission of piety here, simultaneously with the coupling of 
justice and moderation, might suggest either that piety here 
is no longer a part of political virtue in the required sense 
(a suggestion at least fully consonant with 322A in its context) , 
or that one of the following set of alternatives is true. (1) 
Piety is to be equated with either justice or moderation, in 
the sense that to do a pious action is to do a just action or 
to do & moderate one, depending on one’s choice of equation,
3
4and to do a just (or moderate) action is to do a pious one;
(2) Piety is to be included in either justice or moderation, 
in the sense that to do a pious action is to do a just (or 
moderate) one, but to do a just (or moderate) one is not neces» 
s&rily to do a pious one; (3) Piety, justice, and moderation 
are merely different names for the same thing, which is also 
called virtue, and to do an action characterizable by any one 
of them is by definition to do one characterizable by all of 
them; (4) The omission of piety is to be explained by the 
thought that if one possesses either justice or moderation or 
both one must as a matter of fact possess also the virtue of 
piety: that piety is in fact (though not in definition) in­
separable from either or both of the other virtues mentioned*
The resemblance between this set of choices and Socrates' 
subsequent questioning is fairly close» (3) and (4) turn up 
pretty explicitly at 329C^and 3291 respectively, and (1) and 
(2) could well be regarded as subsidiary variants on (3), to 
be investigated only if neither (3) nor (4) turns out. to be the 
whole truth* This state of affairs is hardly fortuitous* Nor 
is this passage alone in omitting piety from the list of vir­
tues: in the myth again moderation and justice are mentioned
together without piety* When Socrates cites Protagoras’ own 
words at 329C he duly cites not only this latter coupling with­
out piety, bat also a list including piety* Such lists are 
found at 323E (where the vices include impiety) and 324E-325A 
(where '’being pious” is coordinate with justice and moderation)·.. 
In short, if we take some of Protagoras' lists of virtues at
5face value, we are presented with a set of coordinate parts of 
Virtue including piety with justice and moderation; but his 
omissions of piety are unfortunate for that point of view. 
Socrates, we may note in passing, has chosen not only his ques­
tions but also his citations with care.
This is already no trifling matter, for all that Socrates 
ironically labels it as such at 323E. It raises, for example, 
the whole question discussed in the Euthyphro^ whether goodness 
and piety are coextensive and if so which is logically prior. 
But there is more to come. Protagoras has more obscurities to 
offer on the next problem, that of the relationship between 
justice and moderation (whether expressed by Sok+ioirovj and 
<rw<?fo<jvv>7 or by.eo&os and So «η). At 322B, in describing the 
destruction of the earliest human communities, he says “They 
were unjust to each other, not having the political art, so 
that they scattered once again and were killed.” Is mutual 
injustice here the only consequence, or merely part of the 
total consequence of the lack of the political art? Is justice 
the whole or merely part of the political art? We are not yet 
told. Is lack of moderation among the reasons for men’s in­
ability to fora cities, or not? Nothing in this passage makes 
it necessary to assume either answer to the exclusion of the 
other; but it should be observed that if injustice is the only 
consequence of lacking political art, then either justice is 
the same thing (under another name) as moderation or the qual­
ity of moderation is superfluous to the political art and to  
man’s survival. Anyway, Hermes is immediately sent to bring
%to mea moderet ion and justice-, And here again Protagoras fails 
to specify, or otherwise indicate, whether moderation is a dis­
tinct quality to be added to the justice whose necessity is al­
ready apparent or whether 'moderation* and 'justice* are virtual 
synonyms used together for rhetorical emphasis. The word 'and' 
can of course be used in Greek as in English to express either 
the genuine addition of things or the rhetorical, conjunction of 
terms. What is more, the further question arises, and is left 
unanswered, whether the functions of ordering the cities and 
cementing friendships belong to moderation and justice severally 
and respectively, or whether the two functions belong equally 
to both virtues. So far Protagoras* words offer no certain 
answer to the questions Socrates is later to raise. Nor, in 
my opinion, is an answer to be seen in the pronoun used by 
Zeus in Protagoras' story, when he refers to moderation and 
justice as 'them'. Once the separate arts have been brought 
into the tale one might expect the virtues of justice and 
moderation to be separate too. But Protagoras is speaking in 
rhetorical style, and this pronoun is little enough to go on,,
The rest of the myth does nothing to clarify our problem. It 
contains nothing to reveal what, if moderation, and justice are 
qualities operative in inter-personal behavior, is the relation 
between these qualities. Protagoras does not say clearly what 
different kinds of action result from the different qualities, 
if they are different, and he offers no other clear differenti­
ation of them.
6
7Similar difficulties beset the analyst of Protagoras* ex­
position of his myth. At 323A a sentence we have already looked 
at speaks of proceeding by way of justice and moderation, with 
an "and” as unclear as the one already discussed in the myth.
The singulars ’’political virtue" and the like help not at all 
to decide whether this unity is that of a face or a large slab 
of gold. But 323A does yield something more definite with the 
words "justice and the rest of political virtue," or 
k-.il T y s  ΤΓο\/ΤίΚη5. (The rendering ’justice
and political virtue besides' is ruled out by the consideration 
that, in view of what the sophist has already said, it would 
be^bsurd for him to distinguish justice from the political 
art as two entirely separate things.) Justice is at last 
established as a part of Virtue. The phrase "justice and the 
rest of political Virtue" at 323B reinforces this point. In 
addition Protagoras begins to distinguish in use between mod­
eration and justice when he says that if a man admits (truly) 
to not possessing justice he is accused of lacking moderation; 
but this is only a beginning, and is decidedly not & clear 
statement of & defined distinction. The lists of qualities, 
already discussed, at 323E and 324E also appear to separate, 
in the first case injustice and impiety, and in the second 
justice, moderation, and holiness. The second mattes its trio 
of qualities by implication info parts of virtue, admittedly 
without making clear exactly what sort of part.
Thus Protagoras creates a 'more or less clear impression 
ixt his listener's mind. But his line of argument between the
two lists is such as to destroy one*s confidence again»* Socra™
tes is invited at 324A to believe that the practice of punish*
ing the tm.just demonstrates the punishers* belief in the possi*
8bility of acquiring Virtue» The a ira of punishment is deter* 
rence from injustice and this aim shows the teachability of 
Virtue» It is not merely that this section exhibits a rapid 
interchange between ’Virtue* and words formed on the root *dik~ 
signifying (for the purposes of ethical discourse in Classical 
Attis Greek) ’just*» The point is that the whole argument, as 
it stands, depends for its validity on the assimilation or the 
indissoluble connection of justice to moderation, and indeed 
to Virtue» For if justice and moderation were distinct quali­
ties, separate parts of the over*all quality of Virtue, then a 
man who has only one of them need not have the whole of Virtue 
» unless it is impossible to possess one of these distinct 
parts without the other(s)4 It follows from this that when 
Protagoras says that the purpose of teaching justice (or 
deterring from injustice) indicates belief in the teachability 
of Virtue he is assuming Athenian belief either in the identity
of justice and Virtue, or the inevitable accompaniment of
9justice by moderation» whether such inevitability is the 
result of absolute similarity or of some other indissoluble 
connection is not here important» If Virtue and justice are 
neither identical nor indissolubly connected, the teachability 
of justice will not necessarily be the teachability of Virtue 
as a whole, and Protagoras8 argument will formally fail» The 
failure could be rectified by stating that justice is only a.»
8
9»
example, and/or that punishment is equally a deterrent from 
other vices» But as the argument stands, it fails»
Does Plato treat the failure as merely formal? Hardly? 
for when Socrates asks his questions at the conclusion of the 
Sophist®s expositiong the first includes the query whether the 
word *justice* denotes a part of Virtue or the whole, the second 
is whether the parts of Virtue (since Protagoras opts for parts) 
are all alike, like the parts of a slab of gold, and the third 
is (granted a difference between the parts) whether they are 
all so bound together that one may not be had without the 
others» The resemblance between the choices open to Protagoras 
after the argument of 324A-C and the choices offered him by 
Socrates at 3290 2S is striking, far too striking to be put 
down to coincidence» It shows us Socrates framing his ques° 
tions with eyes glued both to Protagoras8 use of words and to 
the detailed structure of the Sopbist-s argument.
There is nothing more that is relevant to the present 
issue till 3250, In the meantime the great man tells his 
audience that people do believe Virtue teachable, and in that 
belief set about teaching it, from cradle to grave. They set 
about educating the- younger generation irá Virtue as a whole 
(simply "to ensure that the child will turn out best," 325D), 
Parents tell their children, "This is just, that unjust, and 
this is seemly, that is unseemly, and this la holy, that is 
unholy and do these but do not do those, *■ The relations be­
tween what is just, what is seemly and what is holy are not 
articulated; the terms concerned could, but need not, be merely
different words fot the same thing. Teachers » on taking over 
from parents, pay less Attention to their subject then to 
twoojjf* » orderliness; the literary side of education is de~ 
signed to give by precept and example (just like the parents 
at 325D) instruction in what to doe The musical teaching, and 
this is an important sentence, the musical teaching of the 
citharist inculcates moderation and the avoidance of any wrong™ 
doing in the young0 Let vs translate the last phrase more 
literally; "they care for moderation and that the young may
y- ?  i ^  * c '  <
do no evil," ovvvqs T l£rr<p£ \cukju οη-^ s «v oc Yf.J(
.  f
f. 7 '>tvKot Kovç^ùJaxv , Once again we are pusssled by the word ***-c ;
in this context it could signify either #i.e0* or ’and* 0 The 
whole phrasç raises at least three possibilities which are of 
interest to us. The first is that moderation here is the whole 
of Virtue, and is here equated with it,, Doing nothing bad would 
here be equivalent to making all actione good, (or at worse
neutral)* The second is that moderation is here a part of 
Virtue, and is, as often in Greek thought, the negative part 
involved in refraining from evil,. In this case, if one posses™ 
ses to perfection all the positive virtues, almost if not quite 
all one’s -actions will be (I suppose) virtuous, or at worst 
neutral, and one will (I suppose) do no wrong or at least 
generally avoid wrongdoing» In so far as moderation is nega<* 
tive this would bring ue to the position that it was a concep­
tually distinct part of Virtue, 'but that one could not have the 
other virtues without possessing this one. Here also we-find 
two possibilities that look very like two alternatives later
il
laid by Socrates before Protagoras, The third alternative is 
a highly unlikely one: it is that moderation is here added to
the avoidance of evil and distinguished from It, So strong a 
distinction between moderation and "doing nothing evil" would 
run clean counter to a deep current in Classical Greek thought,^® 
One may retain a suspicion that the motive for Protagoras’ men­
tioning both moderation and the avoidance of wrongdoing was, in 
the fictional context, either to explain the complex term 
’moderation8 and delimit its meaning in this context, or merely 
(once again) to add rhetorical emphasis, But this time these 
considerations have less bearing than earlier on the conclu­
sions the sharp critic would be justified in drawing from his 
words. The crucial thing is that Socrates* group of questions 
fits the ambiguities of this passage also.
One wants to ask further what the connection is between 
the avoidance of wrongdoing, moderation and the. things the 
young were told by their parents on the one hand to do, on the 
other hand not to do. If moderation and avoidance of wrongdoing 
are the same, then the connection is obviously of^ fche closest. 
And the avoidance of injustice will then be part or whole of 
moderation. What the relation is for Protagoras and his critic 
between justice and the avoidance of injustice is a question 
to fee deferred a little.
There is more still to perturb the seeker after Protagoras* 
meaning. When the teachers of music and gymnastic have played 
their part, the city steps in, compelling citiaens to live by 
th e laws. It thus guides the conduct of life, teaching how to
12
rule and be ruled* There is no suggestion that this includes 
only part of Virtue* or that it excludes any part of Virtue* 
Indeed* it is regarded at 326E as evidence of a concern for 
Virtue, quite simply* No man must be altogether without know­
ledge of Virtue* If flute-playing were essential to cities 
(sc* as Virtue or the political art is) people would be as un­
grudging with instruction in it as now in things just and 
lawful* This new pairing of terns is not so important as what 
follows* But "just” and ’’lawful** must be related somehow; 
either they are coextensive, or they are entirely distinct or 
one is included in the other* On the face of it the relation 
of inclusion is less likely, less common in rhetorical Greek* 
Then in the next sentence we have, more significantly, the re­
placement of "things just and lawful" by "justice and Virtue", 
for which is substituted in turn "things just and things law­
ful*" Again it is most likely that justice is either equiva­
lent to Virtue or wholly distinct from it* The hypothesis of 
equivalence is perhaps the most reasonable* Socrates is fully 
justified by this passage alone in inquiring whether Protagoras
believes in fcbaany that justice etc* are parts of Virtue
&.ttr
or/are'somehow equivalente A similar type of ambiguity recurs 
at 327C-D, where men educated by the laws are just, and are 
compelled to take an interest in Virtue*
In short there are signs that not only in the case of 
piety but also in those of moderation and justice Protagoras 
has not made up his mind, and is therefore unclear, on exactly 
the points which Socrates (after some thought, 32$) decides to 
raise with him*
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The question of wisdom and political art in the Speech of
Protagoras is of more evident importance for the rest of the
dialogue, and the tension between wisdom as a part of Virtue
and an art as the whole of the citizen*s Virtue has received
its share of scholarly commento** A point already raised by
12GoMoAo Grube needs integrating into the present context»
In the myth proper, at 321C-D, Prometheus is related to have 
stolen Την ^vrc^ov cro^c^v eruvTfvçCthe wisdom involved in
the arts, together with fire, and given it to Man» There
V * ^  \ *
follows a sentence of great interest, Oov Τ ον
βιον<r©#uv ToiUTfl %σ%εν ΤΓοΚ^τοκγν ύοκ, ·
’'the wisdom concerned with livelihood man thus possessed, but 
the political one (or the political [art]) he did not possess»” 
The symmetry of this sentence would have us supply * wisdom* or 
the place-filler ’one* where the Greek has only "the political" 
In the feminine accusative to agree with the feminine noun for 
’wisdom*» This would pretty clearly suggest the equivalence of 
political Virtue with wisdom - or rather a particular kind of 
wisdom» But the ellipse of the feminine ’art* with certain 
adjectives structured like ’political* is familiar enough in 
Greek, and Protagoras * audience might take him simply to mean 
’the political art*, as opposed to the wisdom concerned with 
technical skills and winning a livelihood» It deserves mention 
that this ic itself would justify Socrates iri inquiring at 3291 
whether Protagoras believes wisdom also to be a part of Virtue 
different from each of the others, even though it appears in 
none of the lists of the virtues in the Great Speech itself»
14
Plato’s reader, like Protagoras’ hearer, would like to know 
precisely how wisdom stands,, Furthermore, whether the struc­
ture of this sentence is Platonic or Protagorean, it so hap­
pens that Protagoras, though permitting the reader to suppose 
his belief in a political wisdom synonymous with Virtue, newer 
actually utters the words ’political wisdom* „ Therefore, when 
Socrates asks him if he thinks wisdom a part of Virtue, Socrates 
is not going flatly against the sophist’s expressed views, and 
Protagoras does not have ringing in his ears his own denial*
The question is sensible, and the answer not self-evidently 
foolish.
The position is equally tricky at 324D, Protagoras men- 
fcione the problem raised by Socrates about good men; the prob­
lem is why good men teach, their own sons in other subjects fit 
for teaching, and make them "wise" in those skills, but make 
them no better than anyone else in that virtue at which they 
themselves are good. Here again Protagoras does not openly 
give voice to an expression of the give-away type of ’wise at 
Virtue*,, but nevertheless the difficulty, which he is here 
sharpening in order to refute it, is much sharper if being good 
at the Virtue of good men is regarded as precisely parallel to 
being wise at other skills. The casual (but not too casual) 
reader would most naturally suppose that Protagoras thought 
Virtue a kind of wisdom, even though he does not himself for­
mally call it such. The question Socrates asks is further 
justified.
15
Deferring the discussion of the relation of ‘wisdom* to 
'art*, we pass to courage, « This receives a unique
treatment. Protagoras does not mention it directly at all in 
the Great Speech, in either myth or argument. Socrates* ques- 
tion at 329E, whether courage also is not a part of Virtue, 
might seem to be merely a piece of opportunism in response to 
the immediate stimulus of Protagoras' statement at 329 E that 
men can be brave without being just. But here also there are 
utterances and omissions in the Great Speech which are rele- 
vaut. At the outset, in Protagoras* description of the primi­
tive state of Man (322B), Man is said to have had arts and 
crafts sufficient for a livelihood. But they did not have "the 
political art, of which a part is the art of war." This is 
important as being the only time in his Speech that the sophist 
explicitly mentions a part or parts of Virtue or of the politi- 
cal art. It is an essential handle for Socrates* dialectic 
which Protagoras thus casually hands to him. The passage is 
also interesting in other ways. What is the relation of the 
art of war to courage?· No hint here, but later it becomes 
moderately clear that Protagoras follows the instinctive belief 
of most people in deeming courage an essential condition of 
skill in war. This emerges at 326B-C. The sophist, recounting 
the gymnast's share in education, announces that bodily train­
ing has the purpose of enabling the body to serve a sound in­
tellect, and of avoiding the necessity, supposedly consequent 
on physical weakness, of being let down by cowardice "in war 
and other a v o c a t i o n s ¿V s K«ù ¿V 7-us ir&fecnv.
16
» This makes courage» though not exclusive to war, 
belong in part to the conditions appropriate to success in it.
To show cowardice in war is evidently deemed bad by Protagoras 
as by virtually every other Greek. Courage (or at least the 
absence of cowardice) is a part of what makes one good at war; 
and so in Protagoras* sense of 'art* it is presumably part of 
the art of war, which in turn is part of political Virtue. The 
weakest possible position on this is that Socrates is justified 
once more by the tenor of the Great Speech, and not only by the 
opportunity offered at 329E, in asking the speaker whether 
courage also is not a part of Virtue in the required sense.
As for omissions, the most important is the neglect on 
Plato's part —  or the avoidance on Protagoras' —  of the pro* 
vision of any passage in which it is implied, even as a possible 
inference, that courage is the whole of Virtue. There is no 
need to read any such implication into the phrase "both in war 
and in other avocations" quoted above; "other" here may well be 
meant allHLnclusively, but' *·γ; or ‘avocations' does not
mean here ‘actions' but 'spheres of action® in a sense exempli­
fied by war. It would be a mistake to read into this any notion, 
for example, of courage in the battle against one's baser self, 
which would link courage with moderation, Protagoras here has 
in mind, as his reference to bodily weakness shows, physical 
courage in the face of external dangers. So courage alone of 
the virtues has not, in the Great Speech or its immediate sequel, 
any connection in Protagoras' mouth with the other virtues or
17
with Virtue itself. Nobody has the right to be surprised that 
when, at 349D, Protagoras regroups his forces after the first 
encounter with Socrates, the position he abandons is that the 
other virtues are distinct from one another, the position on
which he takes his stand is one sharply distinguishing courage 
from the rest. Whether or not the Great Speech is Protagoraan 
down to the kind of detail we have been discussing (a question 
probably unanswerable), Plato is not constructing this dialogue 
at random, but rather with the most careful attention to the 
precise implications of Protagoras* initial grand pronouncement. 
Socrates8 questioning serves to draw out and clarify those im­
plications.
Protagoras* ambiguities and occasional implicit contradic­
tion of himself thus amply justify and explain Socrates* choice 
of questions to bring up when he stops speaking. They might 
even go far to explain why Socrates wishes to hear Protagoras 
expatiate further (a desire expressed at 32SI). Are the vir«
* I
tues then parts of equivalents of Virtue? If distinct parts, 
are they nevertheless as similar as the parts of a piece of 
gold, so that to possess any one of them is to possess gold?
Or are they such that the possession of any one of them guaran­
tees by & chain of implication the possession of each of the 
others? In answer Protagoras is unhesitating and unequivocal:
He separates the virtues from Virtue fro m  each other, and 
apparently wishes to deny any mutual implication. It is possi­
ble to be courageous without being just, and again to be just
18
without being wise. But Protagoras cannot, as we shall see, 
se easily shake off his earlier remarks,. They have already 
excited Socrates* suspicions, and caused him to ask for clari­
fication. How much worse Protagoras* plight will become we 
shall see in the sequel.
II
Frotagoras distinguishes the parts of Virtue from one 
another in virtue of their having, like the part of the face, 
different functions, and being also in other respects different. 
One is not the same sort of thing as another. Neither the 
virtues themselves nor their functions are alike (330A-B). 
Having elicited this, Socrates proceeds to examine the nature 
of each. After, somewhat unnecessarily, asking if he may in­
troduce the term *justice* into the argument Socrates asks 
whether justice is just or unjust. Protagoras admits justice 
to be just, and to be the sort of thing to be just. I agree 
with D. Savan that this is best taken to mean, in effect, that
justice has the function of producing (in some sense) just ac- 
14tions. Similarly holiness is holy, and is evinced (in some 
sense) in holy or pious actions. Now Protagoras denied that 
any one virtue was the same sort as the otherss and Socrates 
next inquires whether justice is therefore not the sort of 
thing to be holy (i.o, to produce holy actions), and whether 
holiness is not the sort of tiling to be just (i.e. to issue in 
just actions). The alternative which Socrates offers is that
tat»tics is the sort of thing to be not-holy, and holiness the
sort of thing to be not-just; that justice issues in notions
not-holy and in fact unholy, ana holiness in actions not-just
and in fact unjust. Socrates would himself prefer to say that
holiness issues i n  just actions and justice in holy ones, and
that justice and holiness are either identical or extremely
alike, but Protagoras demurs, being willing to admit Socrates’
choice only for the sake of the argument, and being prepared
to deny any resemblance between holiness and justice of the
kind that Socrates wishes. What he ¿oes not do is to point
out that not-just is different from unjust; that as many mod*»
eras have reminded us, contradictory is not synonymous with
15contrary.
Scholars have spilled much ink on the question whether 
the corma is s ion of this fallacy by Socrates (if it is a fallacy) 
was intentional on Plato’s part or not. There is indeed no 
sjv Λΐδ s ¡art cut to an answrr, but it may be helpful to put the 
«1 gum nr·, u.n its context, including the Great Speech of Protagoras 
Centrar if-s and contradictories are slippery things, but it so 
happens liat there is a surprisingly large number of inferences 
from contradictory to contrary or parallels drawn between the© 
in that Spea h. Sorae of them ere perhaps more, easily justified 
than others, hut the list below attempts completeness.
(1) According to  Protagoras there was a stage when Haa 
did n o t have tiw political art (3210); at 322B the mere absence 
of the política'.» art (negative) means apparently that men coa· 
mit injustice (contrary). (2) Those should be killed who arc
1 Qo'
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«nuble to possess their share of justice and moderation (322D)» 
Simply because they lack, and are unable to acquire, these 
qualities they are described as & "disease of the city"; it is 
hard to think of them as other than actively unjust* A compli­
cated difficulty arises over the pair of analogies with flute- 
playing* At 323A Protagoras in drawing a distinction between 
the other virtues and political Virtue contrasts (a) boasting 
that one is good at flute-playing when he is not and (fe) saying 
that one is unjust even when he is» There is a rhetorical
parallel, here between the man not good at flute-playing and
cuwl
the unjust man, apparently a -parallel between contrary-''contra­
dictory» 323B furnishes a further rhetorical parallel between 
known unjust whose madness consists in confessing the truth and 
the not-just man who madly does not claim to be just, Protagoras 
again encourages (though he does not formally compel) his 
audience to equate the unjust with the non-just» At first
 ^sight the problem might seem to be solved at 327A-C, where 
16Sav&n has rightly observed the suggestion of a possible ter titee 
quid» There we have an analogy between the good tm n and the 
expert flautist, the total ignoramus of flute-playing and the 
man who is so extreme that the most unjust man might seem just 
in comparison with him» The tertium quid between these is the 
adequate flute-player, apparently the analogue of the normally 
unjust man. This analogy by itself can be a&de to  work out if 
we suppose that the one who plays the flute not-well at 327A Is 
at least a flautist of a sort, only not an expert one; and this
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is a plausible interpretation of the Greek expression pyj
<Ao)\oo\rrt^· But fcke earlier passage there is no par-
ci / >
ticiple to limit the sense of the negative phrase ην' p)
(3λ3β· ), and there the negative ought to cover both contrary 
and neutral (or intermediate); and there the plain negative is 
indeed parallel to the contrary - or what looks like a contrary. 
If we let Protagoras off the hook in this second passage the 
first swallowing of hook line and sinker becomes harder to 
understand, and even more evidently mistaken —  provided just 
and unjust are indeed contraries. (4) Another suggestive sen­
tence appears in Protagoras* argument about punishment. At 
324B rational punishment is supposed to be motivated by the 
desire to ensure that the man punished does not again commit 
injustice; t W  ρη ¿v ÔlS & .  This intention Protagoras 
regards as showing the punishers’ belief that Virtue is teach­
able. This implies that not to commit injustice Is a suffici­
ent condition of Virtue (either directly or through the mutual 
implication of the individual virtues). This in turn implies 
that non-injustice is justice, without there being any third 
state which is neither justice nor injustice. Otherwise there 
is nothing to connect non-injustice with Protagorean Virtue. 
Protagoras, to be sure, does a little to blur the point by in­
serting the apologetic - sounding sentence "at least he punishes 
for deterrence5 sake," ^WOT^piTrjs ÿo » v  9 But the
apologetic tone of "at least" should not be taken too seriously. 
This is, after all, the only proof Protagoras offers for the 
proposition that the Athenians believe Virtue teachable. He
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cannot tmderœine it too farc He must believe, or at least 
wish to convince others, that the argument is sound0 If the 
avoidance of injustice is not either equivalent to or (in one
of the two ways Mentioned above) a sufficient condition of 
Virtue, he lias not formally proved his point* (5) At 325A, in 
a conditional (but mot, in Protagoras” eyes, counterfactúa1) 
sentence* the protases includes the suggestion that a man must 
not act without Virtue but with it; the man who has no share in 
ît is to be taught (logically enough) and punished* Punishment 
fits only ethically wrong, not ethically neutral action* Sim~ 
ilarly at 325B~C the penalty for not learning the lesson of 
Virtue is death; the possibility of being neither virtuous nor 
vicious is here excluded from consideration* Protagoras® bril­
liant rhetoric makes no clear distinction between negative and 
contraryo He deals largely in black and white, usually ignor­
ing the possibility of gray. In the Great Speech he is in full 
rhetorical flow. Typical of the Speech, though not in any sense 
áietaken 'in 'logic, are"those, parents who .tell their children 
•}%lieser things'. pjrja: h p ^ y ^ ythose ; i*n|*oly,M and do not stop. to con­
sider, ' so far as Brotagcras is concerned, that there might be 
some actions which aré neither.·' where the category ’holy’ or 
’unhôîÿ’'does not apply*
Before analysis of these flights of philosophical oratory, 
it is necessary to step aside and look at negative and contrary 
in some ethical Contaste other than those of this dialogue of 
Plato’s,.The words ’just’ and ’justice· are used In Greek as·
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in English of actions or of men. If actions are described as 
just, it may be, according to the feelings of the describer, 
because they fall with in  a set of rules for justice, whatever 
the source of the rules; it may be because the actions concerned 
were done in a certain way, with certain accompanying graces, 
or as M.F. Burayeat has it, in a certain style;^ it may be 
that before the word 1just* is considered fully applicable the 
action must result from a certain disposition. Now if the ac­
tion is commended for falling within certain rules, those rules 
may be either positive. Instructing the persons regulated to 
take certain positive steps; or they may be negative, telling 
us to avoid certain types of act. In the first case there may 
h e a class of actions which will be permissible, but of which 
it would be wrong to say either that they are just or that they 
are unjust - for example (in a normal context) choosing to eat 
sausages rather than egg for breakfast. In the second case 
there can not be any such class; anything not actually forbid­
den may be said to be a just act, and there is no third cholee; 
an action is either forbidden or not forbidden. In this case 
t h e  choice of sausages would clearly be just. If just acts are 
those performed in a certain style, similar considerations 
apply. If the style is positively enjoined upon the agent, then 
there may bs a class of actions neither just nor unjust; lacking 
the necessary style to earn the the title 1just*, but not repre- 
hensibly lacking. On the other hand, if the requisite style is 
a m a tte r of avoidhg certain reprehensible styles, then there
again cannot he such a third class -of action« If the matter fee 
one of disposition, again- similar considerations apply; except 
that it rosy be that here the third class, where possible, may 
be larger than in the first two; for it may include actions 
which, though in other circumstances deacrifeabie as just, do 
not happen in the particular case to be accompanied by the re­
quired disposition. Such actions or acts are not normally 
describabie as unjust, whatever extremist philosophers may have 
said.
Applied to individual human - beings the-words behave some*· 
what differently, A man is, for normal language, ’just* if he 
normally or for the most part does just actions. If a man is 
unjust he will not normally, when confronted with a choice be­
tween just, and unjust acts, choose to act justly, but will, 
with varying frequency, choose to act unjustly. Suppose a man 
to be. neither just nor unjust: he may then be supposed to act
justly in about half of the situations in which he has a choice 
between just and unjust, in the other half he acts unjustly*
What he does in choices morally indifferent, or between acts 
equally just or equally unjust, has nothing to do with his 
being just, or unjust, or not*»just. One would be hard put to 
it to find anyone other than the half~&nd~haIf man who is neither 
just nor unjust, unless, it be a hermit, or a Robinson Crusoe 
before, the arrival of Friday. Perhaps even a Robinson Crusoe 
might be a just man, even if no evidence were..available to 
prove it; but this is a question on which not all philosophers 
would agree,
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It is time to return to Plato’s text. Protagoras’ first 
inference of the kind we are investigating teas from the non­
possession of the political art (including justice) to the com­
mission of unjust acts against each other the moment human 
beings came together. Now men without the virtue (among others) 
of justice might still do just actions in one of two ways; 
either by chance (divine chance, for Plato) or because they did 
not have the full virtue, but nevertheless had an inferior form 
of it which helped to stabilise actions in the strait and narrow 
path of justice. Of course, for Plato, in some of his moods, 
the two are not altogether as distinct as we should wish; either 
can result from right opinion. Protagoras does not allow ex­
plicitly for degrees of justice such that only above a certain 
level is the word ’justice* applicable properly; but he does 
not deny this either. If we divest Protagoras* myth of the 
gods in whose existence he had himself no firm belief, we are 
left surely with a gradual progress towards a just and stable 
society, in the course of which the word ’just* will slowly be­
come more applicable, until it is as fully applicable as one 
can reasonably expect. It would be hard to suggest that until 
this society arrives, no just actions will be done: but it is
equally indefensible to suggest that no unjust action will be 
performed. Is this an adequate defense of Prbtagoras* apparent 
inference that the absence of the political art entails the 
presence of sufficient injustice to submit: the whole of society? 
Arguably not: for it does not follow from the absence of po­
litical art that that enormous proportion of unjust acts will
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be performed, Protagoras does not prove that no just acts 
would be performed in a society devoid of justice; he doe» 
nothing to disprove for example* the suggestion that in such 
a society^ moral choice being random, an equal number of just 
and of unjust acts would get done, leaving society perhaps 
staggering, but still on its feet, Protagoras is vague about 
how much injustice it takes to make society Impossible. A 
society thus staggering might, by what Plato would have called 
"divine chance," cohere, Protagoras' inference from the ab*>
ftS
sence of justice to the cohesion of sufficient unjust acts to 
undermine society is not obviously cast-iron. It is not ob­
viously fallacious either, but in view of its dubious-looking 
general appearance Socrates could feel, after it that another 
inference from contrary to contradictory was worth trying out 
on Protagoras^ just as he felt the questions of 329-330 to be 
worth asking. It is not plain from the Great Speech that 
Protagoras is clear about contraries and contradictories; and 
Socrates could be fishing.
The next example, number (2) above, is even less clear.
If a man is wholly incapable of a just act, then indeed the 
sooner the city is rid of him the better. In any choice be* 
tween just and unjust he will choose the unjust, and the re­
sults will certainly make him a plague. If & man is merely 
incapable of learning to be more often just than unjust, or of 
acquiring a fixed disposition to do just acts, he is always 
likely to be a nuisance, but ha will, not necessarily be so 
disruptive that the only thing to do with him is to cast him
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out, If Protagoras is talking obvious sense„ he must be re~ 
ferring to the man incapable of a just act; but then it is not 
clear that to have no share in justice means that all the agent*s 
actions will necessarily be either neutral or unjust, Here too 
there is a certain fuzziness about Protagoras* interpretation 
of the negative* It is again not clear whether he is simply 
deducing contrary from contradictory or going through a more 
careful process of reasoning..
Certainly at (3) Protagoras shows signs of awareness that
Ί . '
there might be a tilias quid, though not any high degree of 
awareness , We have Ivssta parallel, between someone not good at 
an art and an unjust man. This will hold only if an unjust
man is the negative of s,just man « but this we have seen to 
be dubious. The passage may indirectly throw light on Protago» 
ras® thinking elsewhere. It may be that Protagoras is thinking 
throughout of Virtue as an art orTfc^ yij like flute-playing in 
which non-expertness implies actually bad performance if there
*v *  m m  τττ*ττιΐΓ" “ami* '^iw»»r· JL'rs&¿asutttsB9
is any performance. But Socrates could be pardoned for not de- 
duclag this, i n  the light of difficulties over the question how 
far Protagoras is consistent in treating Virtue as a craft.
And what of thfe middling performer, the middling expert?
Number (5 ) i s  somewhat similar to (1) and (2), but is 
easier to excuse. The man without any share of Virtue may do 
things by chance. But sooner or later he will do 
some deed, worthy of punishment. It is only in form that this 
is an argument from contradictory to contrary.
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But (4)» the last we need discuss, is a little différente
'J
The phrase "in order that he may not again ozbæ-vf,, " must mean
IV*
"in order that he may not again commit an unjust act; even if 
the sense did not require this, the state of injustice is vir­
tually ruled out by the choice of the Aorist Subjunctive. But 
nevertheless there remains a choice between an act contrary to 
rule, an infringement of the correct style, or (to look at the 
matter through the eyes of the punisher) a question of forming 
a disposition or developing a capacity» One,, more rudimentary, 
problem may here be brushed aside; that is the question how a 
man is deterred, by being punished for one particular kind of 
unjust act, from committing another sort of unjust act. Host 
of us would doubt the psychology of such & notion of deterrence; 
the fivefold classification of Virtue is an Inadequate basis 
for penology. But, leaving that aside, the passage implies 
that anyone «ho does not commit an act of injustice, or act 
in an unjust way on any particular occasion, is just. Here 
the rules for just actions or the instructions for a just 
*style* of action would have to be negative, or prohibitive, in 
character. Otherwise the avoidance of injustice or of unjust 
action will not constitute justice, as Protagoras* argument 
requires. If Protagoras* punishers are thinking in terms of 
(say) forming a disposition, the disposition concerned must be 
one which entirely or virtually entirely avoids certain types 
of act. The acts one Is thus disposed against are unjust acts; 
one may be disposed to do only just things or to do only things 
either just or neutral, but what constitutes the disposition in
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this passage is the avoidance of certain types of action, rather 
than the commission of certain types® The avoidance of injus* 
tice in this passage is treated as not merely a necessary bat 
a sufficient condition of justice,, This could be formally cor­
rect only if justice is & matter of obedience to prohibitions®
At this Protagoras* listeners ought to prick up their ears 
and look for signs in the Protagorean society of something more 
than mere prohibitions in ethical matters® He might indeed find 
them in the instructions of the parents to the children; but 
it is to be hoped that those Instructions were clearer to the 
children than they are to the analyst® The instructions are 
”These things are just, those unjust ® ® » do these but do not 
do those®” Supposing all three sets of opposed kinds of act in 
this passage are to be taken with the closing imperatives, the 
parents do not actually say that certain positive injunctions 
must be followed to achieve justice® They divide the relevant 
actions into (at least) two classes, the just and the unjust®
The injunction to do the former need not imply any theory of 
the distinction between just and unjust, being compatible either 
with the assumption that there is a third set neither just nor 
unjust or with the contradictory assumption® Protagoras does 
not therefore make his position clear; and the negative view 
of moderation taken at 326A does not help to decide the problem 
of justice® What Protagoras says in this part of the Great 
Speech is thus compatible with his having made the mistake of 
illegitimately deducing contrary fro m  contradictory, The mis­
take in question would be the inference implied, in the passage
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about punishment, from non-injustice to justice; from the 
avoidance of unjust acts to the possession of justice, Socrates 
would be particularly prone to take this inference as an ille­
gitimate one since he at least probably regarded justice as 
something more than a mere avoidance of injustice.
Another place to find some positive injunctions is in 
Protagoras* statements about the laws of the city. The city, 
at 326C ff,, compels its citizens to live according to the laws, 
offering the laws as an example, and the process is compared 
to one used by teachers of writing. The teachers trace an out*· 
line of the letters for their less advanced pupils to follow.
This comparison indicates a positive statement by the laws of 
what is to be done; whether the laws in fact did give such a 
positive guide to one’s conduct in ancient Athens is here be­
side the point, since our present interest is in Protagoras9 
views. But at 326D Protagoras says that whoever cgoes outside5 these 
rules, these lines traced out by the city, is punished by the 
city* Here again the victim of pimishment might complain that 
it was possible to go outside what the city positively enjoined 
without committing a crime; the city did not dictate in its laws 
one* a choice of breakfast. The city has uo right to punish all 
who go outside the laws unless the laws are negative or partly 
negative in character, and unless it is the negative part(s) of 
the laws which are under consideration. The point is all the 
more relevant in that Protagoras closely associates what is 
f u l with what is just, and further declares that the city’s
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laws are the indication of its Interest in the citizens* Virtue» 
We are thus uncertain whether Protagoras is clear on the ques» 
tien whether the acts which are unlawful and hence unjust are 
necessarily endowed with a quality of injustice contrary to, 
rather than merely contradictory of, the quality of justice.
Apart from observing the possibility that Protagoras slips 
in these last passages over contrary and contradictory, Socrates 
could also observe (a) that Protagoras in his speech proceeds 
with a surely unusual frequency from'a statement about àh eth­
ical contradictory to one about the relevant contrary; (b) that 
it is also far from plain whether Protagoras is in a position 
to justify even those inferences of this kind other than the 
last one we have discussed. It need not surprise us in the 
face of these observations that Socrates should find it worth 
his while to try out on the Sophist an inference from contra­
dictory to contrary; to try on him the deduction from the pre­
miss that holiness produces non-just actions to the conclusion 
that holiness produces unjust actions. Nor is it shocking that 
Socrates should find Protagoras, with the black and white of 
his own rhetoric dancing before his mind's eye, unable for the 
moment to see the subtle shades of gray that he can on occasion 
recognize —  or else unwilling in the face of Socrates * evident 
skill to attempt the distinctions necessary to attack Socrates * 
inference without demolishing his own. Certainly interpreters 
©£ this argument of Socrates should bear in mind the possibility 
that the chief remaining fallacy la it is no mare Socratic than 
it is Protagorean.
3 2
When Protagoras agrees formally to the notion of the eth­
ically indifferent at 35IB if is only after he has cut his 
losses by abandoning some previous positions; .then, in sober 
argument, he can detail the three classes, good, bad, indiffer­
ent? But in his Great Speech he gives only intermittent and 
feeble signs of having thought the matter out and none of car* 
ing about, it,, In Socrates'3 first joust with him he is still 
so under the spell of his own rhetoric that he is unable or un» 
willing to make the effort to undo that rhetoric*6 effect?
When Socrates uses a form of inference which is incorrect butt 
at least on the surface, hard to distinguish from some of his 
own · arguments, then, it is not easy for the Sophist thus early 
in the game to adjust himself to new rules more exacting than 
those of rhetoric? When he has had time to think and is no 
longer bound by his own. previous remarks Protagoras is * vary 
different philosopher?
But Protagoras and Socrates are to some extent at least —  
to how great an extent is of course uncertain «*» puppets in 
the hands of Plato? We shall have to ask ourselves eventually 
what Plato stood to gals by so portraying Protagoras appearing 
to  make mistakes and Socrates turning the tables on his adver­
sary by committing similar errors? But first let us look at 
more of Socrates* attacks?
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III
After the brief tussle with degrees of ÜBdUA'fcy and 
identity at 331C-332A has led to the abandonment of this line 
of reasoning, Socrates starts on another tick. The ensuing 
argument has struck some as wildly fallacious: and Protagoras*
answers seem too readily to give the game away. But re-examin­
ation will suggest that some facets of the Protagoras* original 
manifests account fairly well for rsany at least of this argu­
ment *8 disturbing features.
On the surface the chain of questions beginning at 332A is 
simple, and say be summarized as follows:-κ'^ οσ-ονη , or folly, 
exists, and has an opposite, namely ¿rod/* or Wisdom? Yes,
When men act rightly and beneficially,. do they then a%*few£Ív 
(act moderately and/or sensibly) or the opposite? Clearly they 
display moderation. Conversely, those who act not-rightly act 
foolishly, and do not behave with moderation? Yes, Therefore, 
acting foolishly is the opposite of behaving moderately, and 
folly the opposite of moderate behavior? Yes, So, folly having
a
been declared opposite to both wisdom '(c^ '?.4 ) and moderation 
(ϋΐύ^οβννη > must be identical, since one term can have only one 
opposite.
Several peculiarities of this argument have drawn adverse 
comment. The first end chief of these is the over «-all equivo­
cation on which it rests. ^»c<rvW): has two different senses,
¿Mid m y  légitimât sly heve two opposites, one to each sense, 
Surely Socrates is here a t his most trivial and Protagorae afc
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hla least percipiente Shorey was raore trenchant: "That, of
coarse, is sophistry,"3'^  Socrates, say the critics, is either 
forgetful of logic, or concerned only to beat the sophists at 
their own game» Bat neither hypothesis is very convincing. 
Plato’s Socrates is not always logical, but the illogicalities 
are not usually as transparent as these. Beating the Sophists 
at their own game would be more purposeful in this particular 
case if it were not clear that Protagoras is an opponent to be 
taken seriously, and that Socrates Is the first in this dia­
logue to sin with anything like since blatencyï Protagoras 
has Indeed implicitly contradicted himself, but he has used 
no arguaient a tenth as thick-headed as this one appears to be.
In any case Socrates purports to be playing a different game 
—  that of dialectic as opposed to speechifying; it remains to 
be explained why he should play it to all appearances so poorly.
To explain this we may put another question to the text: 
is there any reason why Protagoras cannot take the obvious way 
out, and distinguish, two senses of * folly® (c^£o«rw*j )? Why 
can he not say that , 8folly* means sometimes ’foolish*
ness* or ’lack of good sense* and sometimes ’self**indulgence*? 
Let us see what effect such an escape would have on his total 
position as previously taken up in this dialogue. Protagoras 
would be required to say that Socrates* argument would be ¡ais- 
taken because there are two sorts of *f©Jly% one Intellectual 
and one @oral. Socrates, he would then say, is equivocating 
on these two senses. If fee were indeed to proceed in this way, 
the results would be far-reaching. We have seen how Protagoras
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in the Great Speech avoids explicitly equating Virtue with the 
intellectual quality of wisdom; and how he nevertheless utters 
a sentence at 32ID which could be taken to mean (though it is 
not the only possible meaning) that Virtue is a , a kind
or part of wisdom. We recall also that st 324B Protagoras 
uses ’make wise* in parallel with *make better*. The anti­
thesis in that passage is ruined if there is a distinction be*» 
tween being made wise at something and being made good at it.
It is now relevant to enlarge on some related problems in the 
Speech,
That , * wisdom*, or *a wisdom9, is in certain con®
texts interchangeable with ’art*, » is well known, Prota­
goras himself speaks of a particular kind of wisdom as embedded 
in art, at 321D, referring to the same thing as the
’’craftsman* s art" at 322B, In the relevant kind of context 
Protagoras can therefore use either ’art9 or ’wisdom* salva 
veritate. Now he is also made to call Virtue an art, which 
might seem to indicate that he would call it also a wisdom; &\nd 
in that case he is on dangerous ground in making wisdom a part 
of Virtue, It is true that Socrates neatly presses the notion 
of Virtue as an art on Protagoras in a series of adroit ques-
JO/
tions usefully documented by Gagarin, ' But intellectualist 
ethics come quite naturally to Protagoras; he is an intellec­
tual, he teaches things of the intellect, and later in the dia­
logue he accepts without hesitation or doubt the primacy of 
intellect in determining human conduct (352B-D), It is not for
nothing that the title "sophist" in which· Protagoras takes so 
much pride is related to the word for ‘wisdom*,
After accepting from Socrates at 319A the suggestion that 
his subject is "the political art,5' Protagoras admits the ex­
pression to his own vocabulary at 322B (twice)There it rep­
resents the sum of moderation and justice or the quality for
which moderation and justice are different names « Then, how-
/
ever, at 322C "the arts" (Ίέχν»ί> ) are distinct, and moderation 
and justice are added to Man’s equipment after the arte„ Hext, 
in the following section, Zeas suggests that there would be no
cities if moderation were confined to a small number of experts 
like the other arts, , ^  This clearly puts Virtue back among the 
arts again. The impression that Virtue belongs among the arts 
is deepened by Protagoras ' use of .. , -ij
Tv*\r, , « carpenter63 or other craftsman*8 ’virtue’, 
with reference to the same thing as at. 322B with the expression 
’craftsman’s art’* The disfincf.ioa between Virtue and art seems 
hers on the point of vanishing* At 322E the words "political 
Virtue" mean the same as the earlier "politic*! art.·" .'Virtues" 
again, at 323A, means the same as ‘arts' ., and is replaced by 
the word "art" in the singular later in the sentence. The lo­
cution "this virtue" at 323C likewise seems to presuppose a set 
of other ‘virtues1, no doubt those referred to at 323B-, But 
at 326S and 327E ’Virtue* is employed by itself as if it were
a sufficient designation for moral or "political" Virtue, with­
out specification. 327B, 327Ç ("a craftsman it this matter," 
i.a. in justice) and other less clear passages all tend to 
assimilate Virtue to the arts. The upshot is that Virtue is
U 6
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an art throughout the Great Speech except for the single pas­
sage in Hermes * address to Zeus* Protagoras has in large 
measure committed himself to the intellectual nature of Virtue, 
to its assimilation (epistemologically) to an art.
To say this is not to deny the obvious fact that Protagoras 
is deeply concerned to show at least one major difference be- 
tween the political and the other arts. He has to show that 
though few are expert in the others, the political art is open 
to all, and indeed known in some degree by all. The distine-
<yAf
tion is fundamental to Protagoras* whole position.^ But that 
does not make Virtue any the less an art, something one can 
learn and teach, something at which one can be skilled, in
Greek (ToéûSs often rendered 'wise*.
Believing these things the sophist not unnaturally finds 
it difficult to distinguish in a moral context between moral 
folly and intellectual folly. If he were to turn round now 
and say that in the sphere of moral actions there were two 
sorts of folly, one moral and one intellectual, he would have 
to specify which was which. If he were then to say that the 
intellectual alone was the opposite of ‘wisdom* then he would 
have to explain the moral importance he attaches to ‘wisdom*; 
if he supposed the intellectual alone to be opposed to * modera-' 
tion* he would be going against a large element in Greek thought 
as well as his own previous remarks according high moral import 
to ‘moderation*.
There does appear to be another way out for Protagoras
but It seems excluded by the context. He could, evidently, say
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that moral folly Is merely a species of intellectual, that it 
is only a (kind of) folly which is opposed to a (kind of) wis­
dom when the word ’folly1 is used as the opposite of ’modera­
tion’ » But this is surely ruled out by the manner in which 
the conversation leads up to the introduction of the opposition 
between ’wisdom’ and ’folly*» The 'wisdom* which Protagoras 
agrees at 332A to oppose to ’folly* is essentially moral in 
nature. He has agreed at 329E-330A that wisdom is a part of 
Virtue, and the discussion has from that point on concerned 
itself with two parts of Virtue, Protagoras must know perfectly 
well that the 'wisdom’ he is asked to appose to 5folly* is 
moral. In such a context it is most natural also to take 
’folly* as moral in tone, since it is moral action which is 
under discussion, ο ΜΜ/νη , folly, had long had associations
i /
with the absence of^gcr») » Virtue, Such associations stem 
from the prudential nature of much early Greek morality, and 
the emphasis it laid on competitive success rather than on whet 
A.W.H. Adkins has called the quiet values,/' The whole contest, 
in both the narrow and the wider sense, is enough to encourage 
both a Protagoras and a Plato to forget the possible non-moral 
interpretation of ’folly’ and ’wisdom* alike. This is not the 
moment in the dialogue for resurrection of the ,
the wisdom, embedded in the crafts, which Protagoras earlier dis- 
tingulehed from political Virtue.
The general point made so'far is that the obvious way out 
of Socrates* argument here is not tfet· easy escape for Protagoras 
in this dialogue that it has been taken to be. Simply to call
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Chat argument fallacious, though true, is not to exhaust its 
description. The reasoning is, like part of his previous argu­
ment, ad hominem. This function of the argument is thrown into 
sharper relief by yet another interesting passage of the Great 
Speech, At 323B Protagoras is contrasting the art of flute­
playing with political Virtue, If anyone falsely boasts of 
being « good flautist he is either laughed at or objected to, 
called mad, and his condition is labelle^ madness. But if he 
lays false claim to Virtue this is put down to moderation, 
rather than madness. Here moderation, apparently the same 
moderation that is at least part of Virtue, stands in direct 
contrast with the state of , madness. One does not laugh
at moral delinquency, though one may (however unjustly) at 
mental derangement Either may be the object of annoyance.
It is therefore at least partly mental derangement that 
Protagoras lias in mind here. It is not of course explicit 
that the contrast is between diametrical opposites, such as 
Socrates is talking about at 332Β-333Β» But that hardly mat­
ters s the moral and intellectual sides of life are merged by 
the contrast between madness and moderation in a single cate­
gory, and Protagoras could not unscramble them without having 
t o  think rather carefully about the implications for this 
piece of rhetoric. It is not likely to be fortuitous that 
Socrates® argument depends on an association thus exemplified 
in Protagoras’ own words.
Another familiar feature of Socrates® line is the apparent
Inference from contradic tory (non-moderation) to contrary
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(folly) at 332E. This need not be a mistake; moderation is a 
negative matter in all probability at 326A, and further discus­
sion of this Is unnecessary. But it is worth observing the 
infinite gentleness with which Socrates leads Protagoras across 
the gap. We shall see how firmly this argument also is embed­
ded in its context» First, Socrate3 asks, do you admit the 
existence of folly {^(*4.^ )? Is wisdom its diametrical op­
posite? Neither of these questions is easy to reject; both 
look like common sense, and after opposing madness and 
at 326A Protagoras is in no mood to protest these points.
When men act rightly and beneficially, do they then act mod- 
erately-cum-sensibly (rw^fov&V ), or in the opposite way? Hare 
Protagoras should perhaps have asked for a rephrasing of the 
question. But he has scarcely had a chance to recover from 
Socrates® exploitation of the Great Speech in the argument that 
what is not-just is unjust. So he neglects once more the pos­
sibility of a tertium quid, and plunges on: folly is after all
difficult to associate with right and beneficial action. Soc­
rates eases his path. After connecting up the verb and noun 
*moderation® and * behave-moderstely* Socrates asks the crucial 
question. “Those who act nofc-rightly act foolishly., not 
sensiJjly-cum-moderately in respect of this particular kind of 
action? *’ This is an awkward one,. Those who act rightly (posi­
tive) are moderate (positive). Now in addition those who act
1 f
net-rightly (negative) act foolishly with dt -privative,
in origin a negative form), end· in so acting are not moderate 
(negative). Therefore acting foolishly is the opposite of acting
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moderately. This is only s good conclusion if either the
legitimacy of reasoning for contradiction to contrary is
recognized or moderation is a merely negative concepte Soc»
rates need accept neither form of this dilemmas but Protagoras
has accepted the second and does nothing to show his rejection
of the first. The crucial word is surely kÿçovfoS , which though
negative in origin and appearance can also, like a number of
other «privative words function as an opposite. Socrates
% ,  /
paves the way by using first in a sentence full of
negatives, and only then suggesting its function as an opposite. 
The transition is the more readily acceptable since in Greek 
there is no obvious opposite for *rightly*, and the phrase 
“not rightly® functions like the English *wrongly*» as an op® 
posite as well as a mere negative. (Indeed it is far from, 
clear that actions or agents can be not,-right without being 
wrong; does the saying *My country right or wrong* omit a 
viable third alternative?) So the statement that those who 
act no brightly act unsens lb ly (or foolishly) is doubly ambiva® 
lent as between contrary and contradictory. It sounds in any 
case reasonable to one with an intellectual1st bias, just as
A, %.
the proposition that acting foolishly (#®phronos etymologically
V
3without sense*) is the opposite of acting moderately (so®phronos, 
etynologically “with sound sense*) sounds reasonable to any ear 
attuned to Greek » even if the latter does not follow from the 
premises leading up to it in the Protagoras. Altfeasagh there
Ί.. ' ~
are a number of legitimate excuses for Protagoras here. Even 
if he has here committed the error of deducing a true contrary
îfrost a contradictory, he may at all events be forgiven s little 
conf
r these considerations adequately defend Socratic 
integrity in argument is another question. Socrates, most prcb~
concept or that it is reasonable to argue from a contradictory 
to a true contrary. We behold here a spectacle very like that 
of skilled legal counsel leading a witness unperceived by the 
judge. The best defense of Socrates* behavior is that he is 
again making use of Protagoras* earlier statements and for 
arguments. It is one of the purposes of this paragraph to draw 
the distinction between excuses valid for Protagoras and ex­
cuses valid for Socrates.
The duel between Socrates and Protagoras over opposites 
has one more oddity to be discussed. When Protagoras agrees 
that right action arises when moderation is present, and wrong 
action when it is absent (332Â-B), he seems to be giving sway 
much of the position he stood originally tc$ defend. He is 
trying to substantiate the view that justice, wisdom, holiness, 
courage, and moderation are separate and distinct parts of
ably does not suppose either that <rw$£cew*) is a purely aàss«fcive
virtue} coordinate like the parts of a f a c e . But one is hard 
put to it to find any f u n c t io n  for the other parts of Virtue 
If all actions are right or wrong according to the presence, 
or absence of moderation in the agent If moderation is - both 
& necessary and a sufficient condition of right (presumably 
virtuous) action, one of the following alternatives would appear.; 
on the face of it to be true. Either (a) ruoderation ia simply
43
equivalent to Virtue or (b) any other part of Virtue must 
necessarily be accompanied by moderation,, Yet Protagoras 
firmly denied both these alternatives at 329C-E - or at least 
denied in general that the possession of any single virtue 
implied possession of the rest*, This suggests two questions; 
why does Protagoras thus surrender his position7 and why does 
Socrates not immediately accept the surrender? The second 
question admits only of conjecture; & plausible one might be 
that Socrates (and Plato) wish to wring more contradictions 
out of the situation before bringing the debate to an end; and 
in particular that Socrates wishes to argue at greater length 
and with greater explicitness for the unity of Virtue in know* 
ledge,. The first question takes us back to Protagoras* Great 
Speech yet again. We recall that Protagoras used the exprès»
/ 2 y fUf \
sion ft ^ijJcXûVvTdL fou βίν
, ’’they take care of self-control and that the young 
do no evil,” One possible interpretation of that sentence, we 
saw, took it to mean that the presence of moderation ensured 
the absence of bad act ions °» (the who 1 e^oF^irtu^ if one adds 
that a contrary can in an ethical deduced from a
that would make moderation„ Anotheri took it tocontradiction Λ
imply that moderation was the inescapable accompaniment of the 
possession of any other of the virtues0 Protagoras has already 
committed himself to a position somewhat like that which he 
takes up in response to Socrates’ probing at 332A-B, Plato*s 
Socrates is merely bringing out Protagoras * stated though? con­
fused opinions on the relations of Virtue and the virtues, If
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Protagoras surrenders his defensive position it is because he 
is not clear precisely where, he stands. To change the metaphor, 
he is caught in a web largely of his own weaving.
If we can thus explain both Protagoras* peculiar admissions 
and Socrates* dubious arguments from the implications of the 
sophist's previous remarks, then we can hardly, without over· 
simplification, accuse Socrates of bare fallacy. We may not 
like Socrates* methods of defeating a distinguished opponent 
in debate, but Protagoras has, in the last resort, himself to 
blame for the predicament in which he finds himself. He pays 
the price for letting his rhetoric run away with him.
IV
The next subject raised is the relationship of moderation 
and justice. Socrates asks If, in Protagoras* opinion, a man 
can, while being unjust, be ’moderate* in respect of the act of 
injustice he commits or the state of injustice he manifests. 
Protagoras disclaims agreement with this ambiguous suggestion 
the first time round. He assents to it eventually, in a 
slightly different form, only for the sake of the argument.
One of the difficulties of the ensuing argument is that the 
same verb ) can mean either to be unjust or to commit
an injustice. It is not clear whether Protagoras is being 
asked to agree that an unjust act can be a moderate act, or 
whether he is only feeing asked to say that a generally unjust 
man, with a disposition to do acts descrifeable as unjust, can
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on occasion comit & moderate act. The second version Protagoras 
could accept - indeed he must, for he has said the virtues
are like the parts of the face, and it is possible t o  be deaf 
without being blind. The other verb important here (<τ&φ£ ovttv ) _ 
Is fortunately not ambiguous to quite the same degree, and means 
usually to be moderate, rather than to perform one moderate ac­
tion. Certainly Protagoras and Socrates are intelligible so 
far as this word is concerned without relying on the possibil­
ity of talking about moderate actions. It appears then that 
if Protagoras has understood Socrates, the latter is asking 
whether a man can h e moderate in respect of an unjust act he 
commits, and it is this that Protagoras rejects shameful.
He allows, however, that there are many people who would accept 
that thesis, and agrees for the sake of argument to defend it. . 
The agreement (in so far as to commit him to anything) commits 
him apparently to the view that injustice is a sensible thing
to do, a reasonable set of rules to live by. But Protagoras
c/u
la no ima,oraliat like the Thraeyaia^fa of Rep. I.
Socrates In reply suggests that moderation (p )
implies being of good sense (literally, ’thinking well1). 
Protagoras of course can no more separate the moral from the 
intellectual aspect of moderation now then in the preceding 
argument; he has to go along with this, willy-nilly. From 
’having good sense5 Socrates proceeds to ’deliberating well*.
Here we are in an area of ambiguity. After a flirtation with 
the intellectual side of moderation, we may now fee back in the 
moral. If depends on whether the Vail* 0/ ’deliberate well1
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refers to morally good deliberation or to successful delibera­
tion, Tiie irmtediate acceptance by Protagoras proves little, 
since, as we have seen, Protagoras is in no position to argue 
the matter out even if he begins to smell the ambiguity. To 
this step is added the rider that the good deliberation is in 
respect of the unjust action which we have been considering 
all the time, Protagoras again does not like this: perhaps
it suggests that the unjust act can be good, which he does 
not wish to admit, even though in the Greek context the view 
was not wholly implausible. Protagoras again signals his
5/
assent for argument’s sake: "So be it" (frrToA „ Socrates now 
asks a question not easy to follow.. He asks whether this good 
deliberation in respect of an unjust action takes place when 
in the unjust action the agent(a) ’do(es) well*, or when he 
does badly. Hera we are enmeshed in another ambiguity, since, 
as is well known, to do well can mean in Greek either to act
well or to fare well. But I doubt if Socrates relies at all 
heavily on that ambiguity here. Goad deliberation as a con­
sequence of good sense seems mora likely to result in acting
Η Λ ~~well than in receiving a regard - in so far as- the Greeks realty
•50
were capable of distinguishing the two. Anyhow, Protagoras 
agrees that one does wall in deliberating well in tbs process 
of injustice. Good deliberation, even in the act of injustice» 
is successful deliberation with good (not necessarily -morally 
good) consequences. Socrates1 next question is harmless 
enough, and Protagoras agrees that there are some good things. 
The next'question in this chain is whether those actions are
good which are beneficial to man.
Where is the argument leading at this point? It is not 
possible to be certain, and it does not perhaps matter very 
much. But at least we can see if there is any plausible con­
tinuation which makes Protagoras* contribution less irrelevant 
than some think it. If the unjust act can be good, or a man 
can be good in respect of an unjust act, then at once Protagoras* 
position is undermined: the %ot*n of the adjective ’good* in
Greek is of course Virtue, and injustice cannot be a virtue.
But Socrates can hardly have intended to take that line, or 
he would not have brought in the then unnecessary notion of 
’beneficial*. One argument he could be laying the foundation 
for is that the injustice in question is beneficial to man: 
from this ha could proceed either to say that Protagoras pur- 
pox* to to teach a virtue whose opposite is beneficial to man, 
or that Protagoras in the myth advanced the view that the ad­
vent of the virtues including justice was beneficial to mankind,. 
Either way the point lies not in the argument itself but in 
positions taken up by Protagoras: the second denies him the
possible escape route that justice need not be beneficial to 
its agent or to the community. If Protagoras is behaving as 
though he expected this line of attack, then we should have an
explanation of-why he should be a little anxious. But in Greek
(thoiaK‘net
it is difficultyto deny that what is good is beneficial, and
Protagoras can/do/^ more than say that a thing can be good 
even without being beneficial to Man. Injustice therefore can 
be ’good* in some sense, as Protagoras has had to admit, without
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its being beneficial to Man - a position he cannot now consis» 
tently take up. To counter this move it is understandable that 
Socrates should ask the further question whether Protagoras 
means to separate good and beneficial altogether, or is content 
with distinguishing good from beneficial to Man. If the former, 
then Protagoras is going to run into problems of ordinary lan« 
gu&ge, in which 'good* apparently did (when used of things) 
imply 'beneficial*. If the latter, then Protagoras is going 
to be compelled to find some candidate for the post of bene» 
fici&ry of injustice other than Man. No wonder Protagoras is 
floundering at this point. Instead of giving (he has not yet 
been asked to) a beneficiary of injustice, he takes refuge in
generalities, saying that there are some things which are
C y
beneficial to Man and some which are not (an irrelevant):
7 *fr
Some which are neither to men, but are one of the other to 
horses » a relevant point: and then goes on to give eramples
of the generally relative nature of '’good*-ness » ’good* re* 
placing 'beneficial* in the course of the argument. The di­
gression, however, returns speedily to the subject of Man, 
with the mention of olive-oil, w h i c h  is bad for animal hair, 
but good for human, and for the human body in general. Finally 
Protagoras cowies up with the point that 'good* is so various 
in application that a thing can be 'good* for one part of man, 
but not for another. This last point is likely to be especially
useful to him, since it might, if he thinks fast enough, enable
\
him to find a'.distinction along these lines between justice and
injustice «— > the one being good and therefore beneficial to man
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in one respect, the other in another respect,. This would save 
the Sophist's bacon by enabling him to admit that injustice in 
successful deliberation is good for man, without being appar­
ently forced to make injustice a virtue or to question whether 
justice is at :er all beneficial to mankind. What Protagoras 
is doing is both to play for time and to maneuver for position.
But Socrates understandably does not see why. in a set 
match of this hind, his interlocutor should be allowed to do 
either of these things, let alone both. He accordingly feigns 
a poor memory —  this from one who has been able to quote with­
out difficulty from Protagoras* earlier lengthy harangue - and 
brings the discussion up short. Which side would have carried 
the day in the incomplete argument is of course impossible to 
say, but Protagoras has by now made some points which are 
clearly going to delay the Socratic victory, even if they do 
not prevent it. This line of argument will not therefore pro­
vide an immediate coupe de grace, and Socrates escapes by
O ^ ^
pleading a breach of his rules by Protagoras.
But this is only a series of guesses, and one can hardly 
extract any evidence worth the name from this passage for the 
general thesis that Protagoras* difficulties stem from his own 
previous admissions as much as from Socrates8 present arguments. 
All that is possible in this case is to show plausibly how this 
incomplete argument could be interpreted without being Incon­
sistent with this general thesis, la doing so it is interest­
ing to find that Protagoras* burst of rhetoric is neither 
wholly irrelevant nor wholly to the point, but is rather a 
curate's egg of a speech.
Mí
' - V
But we have n o t yet answered the question, what Flato had 
to gain by playing this kind of trick on his characters„ If 
the whole were a verbatim historical account of an actual oc­
casion we should have no worries; Socrates would then be shown 
putting his dialectical techniques to uses admittedly ad hominem 
but not dishonestly so* No-one could blame Socrates for using 
premisses ox’ types of inference in which he does not himself 
believe if his opponent does apparently believe in them. To 
apportion blame in this way would be to misunderstand the 
nature of dialectic. What is at first sight puzzling is that 
a great philosopher near the height of his powers should com­
pose & dialogue in which one protagonist’s mistakes or dubie­
ties of premiss or argument are shamelessly taken advantage of 
by the other. What did Plato think he was proving in the 
arguments we have dealt with in this paper?
If ary thesis is correct, the answer is that Plato need not 
have thought was proving any tiling positive here; least of all 
need he have supposed that he was proving the unity of the 
virtues. What he should have deemed himself to have proved Is 
that for one holding Protagoras* views the distinctions be­
tween the virtues i.t is not possible to say some of the things 
that Protagoras has said or to argue in some of the ways in 
which the Sophist appears to argue. If this were the whole 
point, and if Protagoras were the·? person to hold such
views and to speak in such ways we should have to draw one of
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two conclusions; either Plato has set up an Aunt Sally for him­
self to kno_k down, a proceeding whose purpose might well for 
ever escape our insight: or we have here a piece of genuine
history —  not indeed verbatim but giving at least the gist of 
Protagoras' own historical words, whether written or spoken.
But this is not yet a necessary conclusion, and I aza un­
able to bring myself to believe that it is the whole story 
even if it should be proved one day to be a partial truth. The 
fact is that Protagoras is (obviously) not the only person to 
believe that there are differences between the virtues; and 
there is no need to suppose him to be the only person to argue 
from contradictory to contrary. Even Socrates does so from 
time to time. Witness for example Crito 48B-D, where Socrates
first says he is going to consider the question whether his 
proposed escape is just or not, and then says that he is going
to consider what he just said, namely whether the escape is 
just or unjust. It is perhaps significant that the tone of
much of Socrates’ remarks in the Grito is rhetorical. Other
mistakes or dubieties from our portion of the Protagoras ere 
eas iiy found elsewhere also; the Greeks habitually moved from 
intellectual to moral nuances of the word sophrosyne without
making trouble about it. In tying Protagoras in knots Plato 
is also tying up many ordinary speakers of ordinary Greek.
Miera a modern philosopher would give us the bore bones of the 
distinctions necessary, what Plato does is to show us what 
calamities befall those who neglect them. Where the modem 
often aires at simply dispelling the confusions to which ordinary
language is liable, Plato’s purposes may be suspected of greater 
complexity. Plato wishes to prepare the way for the Socratic 
paradoxes, perhaps to show that they are less paradoxical than 
they appear. This in the sense that though some popular ways 
of thinking treated wisdom as a separate virtue, though other 
distinctions between virtues were familiar to popular speech, 
there were nevertheless some strands c£ thought among "the many'' 
which if taken to their logical conclusion were liable to end 
in the paradoxes. This has sometimes been seen as the point 
of the concluding argument of the Protagorae, jand if this is 
right the two main eth5.cal arguments of the dialogue would on 
the present interpretation hang the more closely together.
It is true that another reading of the evidence here 
analysed is possible. Plato may himself have been unclear 
about the extent to which the ethical concepts he is dealing 
with depend on positive injunctions and how much on mere pro­
hibitions. He «¡ay not have seen that there are distinctions 
between the intellectual, and moral spheres which in the last 
resort tend to undermine the central Socratic paradoxes. But 
at present it seems more likely that in the composition of the 
Protagoras he betrays his understanding of these things. First, 
Socrates' initial questions by way of response to Protagoras' 
Great Speech show that Pleto and his principal character have 
thought very deeply about Protagoras * Speech and its precisa 
implications. Secondly it is odd, if Plato did net see these 
problems, that there are remarks embedded {by whomsoever) in 
Protagoras{ Speech which raise?· exactly the questions raised
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by Socrates8 arguments« The whole composition bears the marks 
of deliberate design» But whichever view of Plato’s insight 
be taken, it is to be hoped that scholars will at least pay 
him the compliment of refusing to dismiss the arguments in 
the first round between Socrates and Protagoras as merely 
and obviously fallacious»
h Λ
Footnotes
‘'’'Protagoras 5 doctrine of Justice and Virtue in the 
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», 22, believes that Protagoras tmifieci Virtue (the- Sophist 
does indeed refer to Virtue as *one thing*), and rightly adds, 
"Socrates attacks Protagoras in the following not because he 
united all virtues but because he failed to specify In what 
manner and on. whet basis virtue is one, and what this virtue’s 
nature is,"
-‘.the antecedent of the relative may be either at#try* or 
v i : see Adam ) and the translations of
Guthrie and Jo we 11 -Os twa Id ), But I doubt if the dif­
ference is great'for the purposes of aiy argument, since "all 
political advice1’ in the context must be advice about what is 
politically virtuous, and If ail such counsel must recommend 
what is just and moderate, then political virtue must In some 
sense consist In what is just and/or moderate,.
"322A makes a point of belief In and worship of the gods, 
before man have political virtue (3222) and even before they 
have fully the· techniques necessary for physical Survival, 
Political wisdom is still in Zaps* hands, inaccessible even 
to Prometheus (32IB-322A)· Whatever the "divine portion"
(fewt. ¿*9&4g* ) is at 322A, it does not include any part of politi­
cal virtue so far as we are told,
'I take it that the myth ends at 3220 where the tale of 
Protagoras coaes to an end, Kerferd (JHS 73, 1953, p, 42) has 
the "myth proper" ending here, but the Logos beginning only at 
324D: ' This oa the grounds that at 3249 Protagoras says (Ker~ 
ferd/s translation) "For this point, Socrates, I shall not now 
(cjmA’v. ) tell you a myth, but a Logos," The passage between 
(322B-324D) Kerferd regards as "an explanation and application 
of the ejrth," But this argument does not hold water. By "I 
shall ao longer tell you & myth," Protagoras is merely drawing 
attention to the f&ct that the myth said nothing «about the 
problem he is about to broach. On the previous Subject he had
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application of the myth" is, I think, illusory, I believe 
Guthrie*s translation shows his agreement with on this 
point,
®This issue is often obscure·,by modern translations* To 
take the ones deservedly most used in the English-speaking 
world, Guthrie and the Loeb have here ’wrongdoers,5 and Jowefct* 
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argument at 323A-C is general human reactions. The argument 
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But he nowhere puts ηνφί* in the foreground of his teaching
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with all of this, but it points in some of the right directions 
for inquiry,
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ISSavan op, cit. (previous note) pp. 133ff, attempts to 
absolve Socrates of this fallacy also, but does not I think go 
far enough. He says rightly that the paradigm of the face and 
its parts dominates the argument, and remarks that seeing 
makes no sound and hence sight must be inaudible. Further, 
hearing is invisible. "The analogy," he proceeds, "requires us 
to say, therefore, that justice (understood as ) is
unholy, and that holiness (understood as ) is unjust
« . . * The argument requises us to say not only that justice 
is not holy but also that it is unholy, not only that holiness 
is not just but also that it is unjust. This consequence is 
too monstrous to be acceptable." This would be more convine® 
ing if ^itEeirXt were "clear^that 8 invisible* is an opposite, 
and not a negative word, or that ‘unjust* were a negative word 
and not an opposite. But Savan fails to assimilate the two 
terms in such a way as to make his very important argument 
hang together at this point. It is not immediately clear from 
Plato which alternative Socrates has in mind, if indeed he has 
either clearly before him. But this topic is due for extended 
treatment below.
^Op. cit. (η. 14) p. 133.
1 7"Virtues in Action," The Philosophy of Socrates (ed. G. 
Vlastos) esp. pp. 215ff.
18What Plato Said, p. 126.
I û
Op. cit. (n. 3) p.litftutolrtJi,
*20The word *other5is here omitted by Jowett-Ostwald; a
puzz1ing omis s ion.
9Í
'"Gagarin, op. cit. (n, 3) pp, 142®144.
’Adkins Merit and Responsibility esp. Chaps. I®IV. I 
am not in general convxncid 'by the criticisms of H. Lloyd® Jones 
in the Justice of Ecus (Berkeley, 1971) in so far as they con® 
cerrT"Homeric ancTSrchaic Greek thought.
23“On this see Adkins Merit and Responsibility esp. p. 286.
*4At 336A Socrates accuses him of neglecting both brevity 
and relevance; neither accusation is wholly false.
